Will India Reach Great Power Status?

How is India’s search for great power status similar or different under Narendra Modi compared to the previous generations of leaders since Nehru?

On the cover of Lance Price’s book, The Modi Effect, Narendra Modi appears front and centre below gold-gilded text, resolutely raising his hand, presumably to a crowd of ardent supporters.[1] The sentiment implicit in the photo is one of zealous and fervent purpose: to transform and rejuvenate India. The same enthusiasm and admiration is present across the gamut of other texts on the leader.[2] Of course, Modi had not always been a figure of such magnitude—until very recently he had been a virtual pariah, frozen out of diplomatic relations with Britain and the European Union and refused entry to the United States due to his ‘religious extremism’.[3] On May 16, 2014, however, following one of the most extraordinary general election campaigns in India’s history, Modi entered the record books when he became Prime Minister.[4] His victory, in part, was due to a belief among India’s vast electorate that he might give the country a new sense of direction in foreign relations, at a time when the gap between China and India seemed ever-widening. Indeed, the previous year before his election witnessed an article, published in the journal of Foreign Affairs, entitled “India’s Feeble Foreign Policy.” It contended that the country was resisting its own rise, “as if the political miasma in New Delhi had turned the country into its own worst enemy.”[5] Though this scholarship may have made little impact on general opinion, it is a microcosm of the greater issue at hand: India’s seemingly listless, astrategic approach to becoming a great power. Modi claimed to be able to change this, and his election was widely viewed as signifying a more decisive phase in the country’s foreign policy, compared to the previous Singh administration’s irresoluteness, reticence, and reluctance.[6] Although he had little prior foreign policy experience, his reputation as an ambitious, bullish and decisive leader, and his ideological embrace of Hindutva (Hindu nationalism), led observers to expect a new foreign policy and indeed, even a ‘Modi Doctrine’.[7]

            Within the first two years of his tenure, Modi made busy: he logged as many as 48 foreign visits for both bilateral and multilateral meetings, as well as domestically hosting a plethora of world leaders. This political dynamism has continued until present, galvanising supporters and critics alike.[8] But has this dynamism changed, in any significant way, India’s grand strategy or search to become a great power? Is Modi any different to those before him? According to most scholars, India is still not a great power.[9] After his election, Modi claimed he would make India a ‘leading power’—a disguised and modest locution which certain observers inference as meaning a traditional great power.[10] Yet, whilst Modi’s rhetoric and narrative has ‘accelerated’ a self-perception of greatness and boosted soft power, when compared with previous generations of Indian prime ministers since independence and the leadership of Nehru, there is remarkable lack of tangible, substantive change. Using the theoretical lens of constructivism to juxtapose Modi’s foreign policy and great power status approach with those of his predecessors, it will be proven that while Modi has made a concerted effort to change the perception of India, its literal great power status trajectory has remained unchanged; India is still reticent and nascent in their ambition, following Nehru’s longstanding strategic tradition of non-alignment. Much of this has to do with the structures and norms that define a great power, but also with India’s historically ambiguous strategic culture.

Definitions 

            In order to define ‘great power status’ and, subsequently, Indian ambition, a framework must also be expounded. Such terms have myriad definitions depending upon which theory of International Relations one uses. Whilst structural realism, neo-classical realism and liberalism have their merits, constructivism provides a useful lens for which to discuss India’s approach to great power ambition because it focuses on ideas, collective values, culture, social identity, and norms.[11] Whilst theories like structural realism ascribe ‘black box’s’ to states, claiming that, “culture and identity are, at best, derivative of the distribution of capabilities and have no independent explanatory power”, such intellectual approach gives scant recognition to the potential role different types of government, or the beliefs of political parties and leaders, play in the decision-making process.[12] Constructivism concerns itself with ideational factors, centering upon “a cognitive, intersubjective conception of process in which identities and interests are endogenous to interaction.”[13] As such, states are social constructions, and norms—“a particular set of interests and preferences”—are the basis of interaction.[14] Norms, moreover, are produced through social practice and are continuously contested through elite narratives. Such basis provides a useful framework to explain how foreign policy and great power ambition has evolved across India’s political parties and leaders. Specifically, it can assess whether the Modi regime has been different—or similar—in this regard.[15]

            The term ‘great power’ appeared after the Napoleonic Wars, and for the next 200 years the term has weathered constant alterations in definitions, as well as countries deemed great powers.[16] Hence, today there is still little consensus in IR concerning the elements that constitute this status.[17] Here, however, constructivism helps to produce a broad definition of ‘great power’. Inherently, it argues that the structures that govern the international system, like anarchy, are social constructs: intersubjective understandings of beliefs, ideas, and identities guide state behaviour, in turn providing norms and institutions that define reality.[18] These perceptual foundations act as ‘intervening variables’ between states and their material capabilities, which allows for an approach that emphasizes domestic factors, history and values. As Ogden notes, “Great power status is nothing static but a product of a fluctuational historic, material and ideational process.”[19] Hence, great powers are designated as such due to a mixture of multiple factors—not just military or economic strength. Furthermore, perception from outside and within is studied, regardless of material strengths or weaknesses.[20] Another aspect to consider, in further contrast to theories that focus on material and ‘hard’ power, is Joseph Nye’s ‘soft’ power. Soft power is, in Nye’s words, “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments…the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.”[21] Such power also provides legitimacy, if the state can convince others. Hence, a definition of ‘great power’ is still difficult to separate from the array of contributing factors. However, special consideration must be given in a constructivist framework to history, values, perception, and soft power.

            Although constructivism and great powers have now been demarcated, there is still the issue of India’s ‘search for great power status.’ Implicit in the phrase ‘search’ is the assumption that India has not yet achieved status—a point of fact many scholars hold.[22] But how, then, is a state meant to attain this eminence? According to most, achieving great power status involves the synthesis of multiple criteria, variables, and indicators. Moreover, integral to the earning of such status is the ability and assertion of being fully independent and self-sufficient; the state can effectively preserve its sovereignty against the potentially harmful will of others. Yet, as the last sixty-five-odd years have revealed, the mere preservation of an impressive system of self-rule is insufficient for securing great power capabilities.[23] Other contributing factors include military and economic prowess, landmass, geo-strategic location, strategic outlook, state dynamics, diplomatic capabilities, international leadership, and perception.[24] With regard to India, scholars and politicians generally point to three reasons behind its failure to be recognised: feeble economic and social figures, the country’s relatively limited global impact, and the dearth of strategic culture.[25] As Lunev and Shavlay argue, it is the latter which has restricted India’s rise—and a subject that continues to uphold continuity in foreign policy from Nehru to Modi.[26]

Strategy Inchoate

            Until recently, culture did not factor significantly into theorists, military experts, or scholars’ conceptions of strategy—it was simply a complementary factor to account for epiphenomenon that might not be fully justified by rational, security-maximising explanations.[27] This dearth of attention was transformed, however, by Jack Snyder’s seminal work which combined the two phenomena in a piece elucidating Russian ‘strategic culture’ in 1977. Similar to constructivist thought—and just as such ideational theories began to gain prominence—Snyder defined strategic culture as “a set of general beliefs, attitudes and behavior patterns with regard to nuclear strategy [that] has achieved a state of semipermanence that places them on the level of “culture” rather than mere ‘policy’”.[28] The work was highly formative: it asked strategic thinkers to consider Soviet attitudes and decisions as not only due to their preponderance for Communism, but also their geopolitical position and Tsarist legacy. It turned the contemporary devotion to game theory and political science back to its original strategic roots in geography and history.[29] What followed were two successive generations of strategic culture, each with their own distinct methodological approaches. But, despite the incessant debate, strategic culture survived and has proven itself to be a potent analytical framework, especially in the context of India.[30]

            The Indian debate over strategic culture began in response to George Tanham’s controversial 1992 essay on strategic thought, in which he claimed that Indian elites had shown “little evidence of having thought coherently and systematically about national strategy.”[31] Building his assessment off a lack of systematic treatises, he contended that such deficiency in long-term planning was grounded in India’s historical and cultural development. This forced India into a largely reactive stance, only ever responding to external stimuli of international events and pressures since its independence.[32] Of course, such claims of the nonexistence of strategic thinking have been partly confirmed by the total absence of any declaratory documents explicitly articulating India’s security objectives—even today. Not only scholars, but politicians noticed, causing India’s former Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh, to lament that political elites had not seriously thought about foreign policy deliberately or strategically (although, ironically, during his term he changed little of what he decried).[33]

Notwithstanding Tanham’s methodological and theoretical shortcomings which critics were quick to point out, his work led to a lively scholarly and political debate over the origins, evolution, and presence of Indian strategic culture. Within this deliberation, myriad scholars have rightly contended that strategic culture does not have to be visibly expressed to be present. Instead, Indian strategic thought can be deduced from its historical behaviour militarily, economically, and diplomatically.[34] It is within this investigation into Indian history that claims of natural inheritance and ambition emerge. More importantly, however, it is within this strategic culture that we find India’s leaders’ inability to shape a new, bolder course for their nation towards attaining great power status.

Due to India’s spiritual, natural borders which encompass the nation, Indian elites are convinced the modern state is the natural inheritor of the subcontinent and the great, enduring civilization that has remained. As such, this modern state must be accorded respect and status, regardless of its economic or military power. Indeed, Indian claims to the subcontinent go as far back as the Mughal Empire; the premise of legacy is engrained in their collective consciousness, forming identity and norms around it. They believe they have a natural claim to greatness, stemming from when India was “a world in itself, a culture and a civilization which gave shape to all things . . . [in which] foreign influences poured in, often influenced that culture and were absorbed.”[35] This perception of eternal existence, combined with past historical significance in foreign affairs and centrality in Asia, means that India’s normative aspiration for great power is not only valid, but self-evident.[36]

Because this history demands recognition, rights, and responsibilities, the post-independence leaders—Modi’s predecessors—reinforced these values ad-nauseum. Moreover, due to India’s subjugation under British rule, these leaders were informed by a healthy dose of suspicion towards the global system and power politics, which in turn defined an anti-Western approach away from expansionism and towards defense. In short, Indian strategic cultural aims, birthed from a proud self-importance, inheritance, and colonial Raj history, are therefore based in autonomy, non-alignment, multipolarity, and non-violence (or at least restraint in the use of force).[37] This strategic culture is unremitting from Nehru to Modi, and it is a significant reason for Modi’s failure to make any significant headway in his search to make India a great power—Indian leaders are shackled by the past.

Predecessors and Continuity

            In order to retreat into peace and security, away from the rapidly deteriorating international situation of the Cold War, newly independent (1947) India under Jawaharlal Nehru sought non-alignment. Non-alignment implied not joining any ideological power alignments whilst also trying to maintain friendly relations with all nations, helping to preserve some sense of world peace. The idea was especially potent because India emerged from the Partition with a perceptibly precarious economic position. Ravaged by the British departure, poverty and misery were rampant. Amid this unsettling domestic situation, as well as the one on the global stage, India adjusted her foreign policy to meet her economic needs.[38]

            Central to Nehru’s vision for India was making India a world power—he did not hide this ambition. By virtue of its size, history, and culture, he used to argue, India would always occupy a central role in world politics—its huge potential in humans and natural resources meant it was fully capable of making its presence felt. In September 1954, Nehru, whilst speaking on China as a potential great power, mentioned in passing that “India would be the Fourth great power in the normal course of development.” However, when asked about his comment a couple days later, he walked it back, explaining that he did not mean to envisage India as a great power in the usual sense:

We would, however, like to compete with them in the urge to peace and welfare of the people. The whole idea of rivalry and competition between nations, big or small, should become outdated now, and the idea of cooperative effort should take its place in order to solve the problems of the world.[39]

Yet Nehru was never able to translate his vision into reality due to two reasons: his ideological chastity and overemphasis on autonomy in foreign policy, and his monopolization of this foreign policy instead of laying an institutional base “to make it attuned to the hard-nosed power politics.”[40] Subsequently, this situation has continued—Nehru’s successors harped upon the same mantra of non-alignment, although defense policy became increasingly realist in outlook. Still, instead of remaining flexible and allowing shifts in policy, they believed such action might induce more trouble.[41] In essence, Nehru’s role in Indian strategic culture is fundamental to understanding it’s great power ambition. His leadership and vocal repetition of Indian greatness, non-alignment and multi-polarity set a normative basis which those after him followed rather uncreatively.[42]

            After Nehru’s death in 1964, Indira Ghandi succeeded the brief tenure of Lal Shastri. Indira maintained Nehru’s heritage and rhetoric, albeit with a less idealistic attitude, relying more on assertive power politics to achieve national interests.[43]’[44] Under her leadership, India began testing nuclear devices. In 1998, moreover, they became a nuclear power, fulfilling a vital step towards great power recognition. Moreover, the end of the Soviet Union was a watershed moment which saw India expand its network of trading partners. Likewise, under the presidency of George W. Bush, India began closer relations with the US.[45] Broadly speaking, however, things continued as India’s strategic culture required: non-alignment, strategic abstruseness, and a claim to recognition.

             As aforementioned, a great deal of hype surrounded Modi’s election—Indians saw him as a bullish nationalist, capable of pulling India out of its strategic rut. Compared to the ‘feeble and mumbling’ Manmohan Singh, his charisma excited. However, it appears that Modi has also stayed in line with the Indian strategic culture set by Nehru, even though he enjoys a greater level of opportunity to change direction thanks to his overwhelming support in the lower house of parliament—a luxury no Indian prime minister has enjoyed since 1989.[46]

Whilst Modi is conscious of India’s ‘glorious’ heritage and expects India to play a ‘leading’ role in international affairs, he is still in line with previous administrations ‘modus vivendi’ of great power ambition, although his choice of language is admittedly different.[47] Yet to the term ‘leading’ power is like Nehru’s public revision: a sidestep to avoid the responsibility and onus of a traditional great power.  Fundamentally, moreover, the Modi government has seen no explicit articulation of a new vision, grand strategy, policy framework, or ‘Modi Doctrine’. Although his government’s initiatives seem to represent a more energized vision of earlier foreign policy changes, this is to some degree to be expected of a rising power seeking recognition. As a forum of India’s strategic thinkers concluded, “while Modi has undeniably put a stamp on foreign policy, substantive changes have been minimal…[it] remains similar to those of the previous administration.”[48]

            In line with such statements, Modi’s rhetoric and discourse is particularly relevant. As Ogden contends, he has made a concerted effort to integrate a narrative to ‘accelerate’ India’s recognition. As he declared to his supporters in 2014: “I assure you that this country [India] has a destiny.” Such assertions have nationalist undertones consistent with Indian strategic culture. Moreover, as has been mentioned, vital to great power recognition is an augmentation of autonomy. Realizing such autonomy—and ensuring this is perceived by others—rests upon accruing enough power for India to articulate its own interests to the world, marking continuity with the long-held preference for self-sufficiency. Predominant in these narratives is increasing the ‘weight’ of India’s economy and domestic modernization, like ‘Brand India’.[49]’[50] In keeping with Singh’s administration, too, Modi has deepened ties with the United States to sure up sponsorship from a ‘gatekeeper’.[51] Ogden here marks a tone-shift in Modi’s rhetorical approach, although whether this is significant enough to hearal marked change from previous administrations and Indian strategic culture is dubious.

            One aspect of Modi’s foreign policy observers speculated might shake-up prior foreign policy traditions was Hindutva and his casting as a populist.[52] Yet even here, while religious diplomacy has played a role, he has co-opted it into foreign affairs to be more inclusive than how he employs it domestically.[53] In fact, as Hall notes, Modi’s attempt at reinvention of Nehruvian rhetoric with Hindu thought proved ‘extremely challenging’ internationally and failed to create a narrative, although casting himself in Hindu-nationalist language proved electorally advantageous. Like his predecessors, Modi sought to engender an image of himself as a respected player internationally to bolster his nationalistic standing amongst Indian voters and potential donors within and outside the country—his many trips abroad are proof.[54] As such, Hinduvta proved a domestic advantage, and did not reflect itself outwardly in foreign policy reinvention. Overall, Modi has been unsuccessful in unshackling himself from prior administrations’ rhetoric and great power approach, which has born scant change. He has deviated little from path set for him.[55]

Differences?

            Perhaps the only difference worth noting in Modi’s search for great power status is his bolstering of soft power: it wasn’t until his ascension that the country developed a specific strategy on the subject.[56] Using the county’s historical, cultural, and religious features, Modi has renewed emphasis on yoga (and Ayurveda), democratic values, and Buddhist spirituality. Success on this front became apparent when the UNGA approved International Yoga Day in 2014. Moreover, his aggressive public relations and marketing campaign to boost India’s economic growth shows promise. Such attempts at soft power are a strategic ploy to draw attention towards Indian culture, peace, and greatness, all whilst assuaging the build-up of hard power.[57]

            It is pertinent here to acknowledge the other side of this scholarly debate on Modi’s impact. Noted foreign policy analyst Raja Mohanan is a vigorous defender that Modi has drastically changed Indian foreign policy. Indeed, he contends that Modi has shifted India, shedding Nehruvian non-alignment shibboleths and removing such language from the BJP’s manifesto.[58] This is a worthwhile claim, based in elite narratives and the creation of new norms. Yet even though Modi appears to have done so to cast off Nehruvian strategy, he has not come up with a coherent substitute. Absence of non-alignment narrative does not fundamentally alter the orientation of Indian foreign policy around its strategic culture.[59] In fact, recent events appear to show that Modi has seemingly buckled once more to Nehru’s non-alignment.

Following the recent developments concerning Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Modi has met with Putin in Delhi. Importantly, Modi has failed to join the much of the West in condemnation.[60] This has historical basis. India has been careful not to support sanctions against Moscow or even to criticize it openly ever since its intervention in Ukraine in 2014. New Delhi continues to buy substantial quantities of weapons from Moscow, and is mindful of retaining its long history of steady relations. In 2015, Indian President Pranab Mukherjee pointedly observed that, despite Russia's ‘difficult moments’, the relationship “will not be affected by the winds of transient global political trends.”[61] Modi continues to tread the fine line between claiming a leading role and making sure not to make too many enemies in the process, but it is a path treaded before.

Conclusions

            To summarise this essay best, it is apt to assess the great many scholarly articles and narratives that poignantly and pithily encapsulate this Modi debate: “A new brand, or just repackaging?”; “The More Things Change, the More They Remain the Same”; “Semantics or substantive?”; “A trajectory unchanged”; “Staggering forward”.[62] While Modi has certainly made a distinctive, concerted effort to rejuvenate Indian ambition towards becoming a great power, he falls short of making any tangible change. His approach to boosting soft power has been his most significant departure from previous administrations, yet he continues in their footsteps in his language and foreign policy approach. Using constructivism to analyse Indian history, identities, narratives and norms, this is apparent. So far, Modi has made his mark—it’s just that the mark is still overshadowed by Nehru and Indian strategic culture. More generally, it would appear, India has not fully abandoned its quixotic traditions.[63] Perhaps the future years of his reign will provide more meaningful attempts at great power status. Until then, India will continue searching.

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[1] Lance Price, The Modi Effect: Inside Narendra Modi's Campaign to Transform India. 2016: Cover.

[2] Andy Marino, Narendra Modi, 2015.

[3] Ashok Anand, One vs All: Narendra Modi: Pariah to Paragon. 2016: xxi.

[4] Price, The Modi Effect, 1-2.

[5] Manjari Miller, “India’s Feeble Foreign Policy: A Would-Be Great Power Resists Its Own Rise,” (2013).

[6] Rajesh Basrur, “Modi's Foreign Policy Fundamentals: A Trajectory Unchanged,” (2017): 7.

[7] Surupa Gupta, et al. “Indian Foreign Policy under Modi: A New Brand or Just Repackaging?” (2018): 3.

[8] Eswaran Sridharan, “Where is India headed?” (2017): 51.

[9] Aakriti Tandon, “Transforming the Unbound Elephant to the Lovable Asian Hulk,” (2016): 58.

[10] Ashley Tellis, “India as a Leading Power.” (2016): 4-5.

[11] Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory.” (1998): 171-3.

[12] Peter Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Post-War Japan, 1996: 17.

[13] Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It” (1992): 394.

[14] Hopf, 175.

[15] Chris Ogden, “Tone Shift: India's Dominant Foreign Policy Aims under Modi.” (2018): 7.

[16] Sergey Lunev and Ellina Shavlay. “India as a Global Power: The Strategic Culture Problems.” (2021): 526.

[17] Chris Ogden, China and India: Asia's Emergent Great Powers, 2017: 15.

[18] Stanley Lim, “Sticks and Stones: Realism, Constructivism, Rhetoric, and Great Power Competition.”

[19] Ogden, 2017: 16.

[20] Chris Ogden, Indian Foreign Policy, 2014: 254.

[21] Joseph Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.” (2008): 94.

[22] Bharat Karnad, Why India Is Not a Great Power (Yet). 2015.

[23] Tellis, 2016, 6.

[24] Ogden, Indian Foreign Policy, 255.

[25] Tellis, 1.

[26] Lunev and Shavlay. “India as a Global Power,” 533-7.

[27] Nicolas Blarel, “India’s Strategic Culture(s),” Chapter in Ganguly, Sumit, et al. 2018: 419-20.

[28] Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations, 1977, v.

[29] Hew Strachan, “The Limitations of Strategic Culture.” 136.

[30] Alastair Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture.” (1995): 46.

[31] George Tanham, Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay. 1992: 5.

[32] David Pant, “Indian Strategic Culture: The Debate and its Consequences,” Chapter in Scott, David. 2015: 15.

[33] Ian Hall, “The Persistence of Nehruvianism in India’s Strategic Culture,” 142.

[34] Blarel, 425.

[35] Nehru in Ogden, 2017, 45.

[36] Roger Jones, “India’s Strategic Culture,” (2006): 10.

[37] Ogden, 2017: 46.

[38] Mannaraswamighala Rajan, India and International Affairs, 1999: 4-6.

[39] Ibid., 5.

[40] B. Jain, Global Power: India's Foreign Policy 1947-2006. 2009: 219.

[41] Ganguly, India as an Emerging Power. 2003: 2.

[42] Hall, “The Persistence of Nehruvianism in India’s Strategic Culture,” 143.

[43] Christian Wagner, “India’s Gradual Rise.” (2010): 65.

[44] Ganguly and Pardesi, “Explaining Sixty Years of India's Foreign Policy,”  (2009): 4.

[45] Tellis, 2016, 4.

[46] Gupta, et al., 5.

[47] Sridharan, “Where is India headed?” 58.

[48] Gupta, 1.

[49] Ogden, “Tone-Shift,” 8-10

[50] Veena Kukreja, “India in the Emergent Multipolar World Order” (2020): 11.

[51] Ogden, “Tone-Shift,” 8-10.

[52] Christophe Jaffrelot and Cynthia Schoch. Modi's India, 2021: 148-9.

[53] Gupta, 5.

[54] Ian Hall, Modi and the Reinvention of Indian Foreign Policy. 2019: 150-155.

[55] Basrur, 9; 25.

[56] Lunev and Shavlay. 531.

[57] Tandon, 61.

[58] Raja Mohanan, Modi's World: Expanding India's Sphere of Influence. 2015: 210-212.

[59] Ganguly, “Has Modi Truly Changed India's Foreign Policy?” (2017): 131

[60] Vikas Pandey, “Vladimir Putin: What Russian President's India Visit Means for World Politics.” BBC News.

[61] Basrur, 17-8.

[62] Gupta; Pardesi; Basrur; Karnard, Staggering Forward, 2018.

[63] Chellaney, “The Modi Phenomenon and the Re-Making of India.” (2018): 47.